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In	this	paper	we	examine	the	pursuit	of	celebrity	through	the	live	broadcast	(‘streaming’)	of	video	games	as	an	expression	of	an	emerging	moral	economy	of
contemporary	digital	capitalism.	Live	streaming	is	a	novel	form	overwhelmingly	found	amongst	young	people	disproportionately	harmed	by	the	economic	crisis,
and	we	propose	that	the	contraction	of	employment	opportunities	is	giving	rise	to	a	strong	imperative	to	be	seen,	which	finds	an	outlet	in	the	practices	of	self-
presentation,	self-promotion	and	entrepreneurial	enterprise	that	are	central	to	financially-successful	live	streaming.	We	first	outline	relevant	contemporary
economic	conditions,	the	disproportionately	high	prizes	at	the	top	of	career	paths,	the	attendant	lures	of	fame	and	fortune,	and	how	the	politics	of	play	have
been	affected	by	these	changes.	We	then	explore	Twitch.tv	(the	leading	game	live	streaming	platform)	as	our	case	study,	covering	how	streamers	make
themselves	appealing,	market	themselves,	profit,	and	how	the	platform’s	affordances	are	interwoven	into	these	questions.	In	doing	so,	we	present	Twitch	as
illustrative	of	the	broader	phenomenon	of	‘digital	celebrity’	and	argue	its	practices	reflect	changes	in	work	opportunities	and	social	identity.	In	particular,	we
show	that	Twitch	is	a	platform	that	allows	neoliberal	aspirations	to	play	out	through	competitive	performance.
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Introduction
When	a	cultural	form	is	novel,	it	can	too	easily	be	treated	in	an	isolated	frame	of	reference	that	renders	opaque	its	connections	to	phenomena	either	anterior	or
concurrent.	Our	argument	in	this	paper	is	that	the	live	broadcast	of	video	games	(referred	to	henceforth	by	its	common	title	of	‘live	streaming’),	specifically	by
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those	who	have	become	celebrities	through	this	practice	and	those	who	aspire	to	become	celebrities,	should	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	an	emerging	moral
economy	of	digital	capitalism	[1],	which	in	turn	needs	to	be	understood	as	part	of	a	long-term	transformation	of	labour	markets	and	of	capitalism	itself.	These
changes	have	intensified	in	recent	years,	with	the	widespread	imposition	of	austerity	policies,	implemented	with	the	stated	belief	that	a	voluntary	deflation	in
wages	and	prices,	along	with	cuts	to	the	state’s	budget	and	debts,	will	serve	to	restore	competitiveness	(Blyth,	2013).
However,	such	policies	can	only	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	broader	political	and	economic	context	in	which	they	come	to	be	seen	as	tenable	(Seymour,	2014).
The	immediate	antecedent	to	their	adoption	is	of	course	the	financial	crisis	of	2007–2008,	with	the	subsequent	development	of	policy	representing	a	striking
process	of	improvisation	by	formerly	over-confident	elites	(Sorkin,	2009;	Varoufakis,	2016,	2013).	But	their	intellectual	and	institutional	roots	extend	much
further	back,	constituting	an	elaborated	form	of	doctrines	which	are	far	from	new	[2],	in	response	to	a	crisis	which	has	been	gestating	within	the	capitalist
economy	since	at	least	the	1970s	(Crouch,	2011;	Streeck,	2014).	What	were	once	invisible	trends	have	now,	suddenly	and	precipitously,	become	visible
(Sassen,	2014).
This	raises	an	obvious	question:	how	should	they	be	theorised?	This	paper	is	intended	as	a	contribution	to	such	a	project,	through	the	case	study	of	a	highly
novel	moral	form,	one	overwhelmingly	found	amongst	the	young	people	who	have	been	disproportionately	harmed	by	the	economic	crisis	(Allen,	2016).	Video
game	‘streamers’	are	individuals	who	are	largely	between	18	and	30,	earn	less	than	US$50,000	a	year	(although	highly	successful	streaming	celebrities	make	far
more),	and	are	generally	politically	inactive	(Quantcast,	2016);	such	a	demographic	profile	invites	many	questions	about	both	the	lives	of	aspiring	streamers,
and	indeed	for	understanding	why	they	might	have	become	interested	in	making	a	living	from	the	practice	in	the	first	place.	Our	concern	with	this	paper	is	not
however	with	the	origin	of	the	crisis,	but	rather	with	the	moral	economy	it	is	giving	rise	to	and	how	people	cope	with	it.	We	wish	to	consider	how	a	contraction	of
opportunities	is	giving	rise	to	an	experienced	imperative	to	be	seen:	the	possibility	of	fame	comes	to	be	seized	upon	as	a	way	to	ensure	one’s	future	security
under	bleak	circumstances,	usually	in	the	absence	of	any	clear	idea	of	how	the	hoped	for	end	state	will	be	brought	about.
We	will	analyse	celebrity	streaming	practices	in	these	terms,	as	an	intended	vector	of	self-transformation	but,	in	reality,	for	most	a	vortex	which	can	only	reliably
equip	a	small	number	to	manage	the	demands	of	a	precarious	future.	The	imperative	to	be	seen	does	not	occur	in	a	vacuum,	but	intersects	with	the	emergence
of	digital	platforms	with	their	own	distinctive	politics	(Ask,	et	al.,	2019)	and	political	economies	(Nieborg	and	Poell,	2018).	In	this	paper	we	use	the	case	study	of
celebrity	streaming	to	address	the	broader	question	of	how	people	attempt	to	cope	[3]	with	the	emerging	realities	of	digital	capitalism	[4],	as	well	as	how	these
endeavours	will	feed	back	into	the	changes	which	are	generating	them.	Our	argument	is	that	the	imperative	to	be	seen	leaves	people	ripe	for	(self)
commodification	by	platforms	whose	primary	focus	is	on	the	accumulation	of	attention,	leaving	them	inclined	to	nurture	and	promote	those	figures	who
demonstrate	a	capacity	to	win	the	attention	of	others.
	
The	growing	lure	of	fame	and	fortune
The	language	of	occupational	opportunity	is	a	potent	one	within	Anglo-American	capitalism,	with	corresponding	ideals	of	the	“American	dream”	and	“meritocracy”
exercising	a	profound	influence	over	respective	national	conversations.	In	so	far	as	these	ideas	are	experienced	as	plausible,	it	reflects	a	cultural	awareness	of
the	financial	and	social	rewards	accorded	to	those	who	have	reached	the	pinnacle	of	their	fields.	The	expectation	of	extremely	high	salaries	for	high-ranking
professions	has	now	been	normalised	across	most	advanced	economies	[5].	Finance	was	obviously	an	originator	in	this	respect,	yet	in	recent	years	the	already
steadily	increasing	salaries	and	bonuses	in	finance	have	been	superseded	by	annual	incomes	in	hedge	funds	and	private	equity	that	are	reliably	in	the	millions.
This	has	been	accompanied	by	a	cultural	celebration	of	such	figures	for	‘striking	out	on	their	own’	[6].	Those	billionaires	who	embraced	public	works,	particularly
those	who	are	current	or	former	tech	prodigies,	enjoy	a	prominent	public	profile	as	a	result	both	of	the	allure	of	perceived	technological	innovation	and	their
diverse	philanthropic	entanglements	(Losse,	2012;	McGoey,	2015;	Vance,	2015).	Perhaps	more	influentially,	the	stratospheric	incomes	of	celebrities	across	a
range	of	fields	mingle	with	the	minutiae	of	their	daily	lives	in	a	media	culture	dependent	on	celebrity,	even	if	manufactured	from	the	lives	of	‘ordinary	people’,	in
order	to	satiate	its	structural	demand	for	content	(Turner,	2010).
The	reality	of	such	a	prospect	is	more	questionable	for	most.	The	high-profile	beneficiaries	of	the	two	Silicon	Valley	‘gold	rushes’	[7]	have	helped	engender	a
culture	of	frantic	networking	and	compulsive	self-marketing	in	which	we	can	find	countless	aspirants	for	each	success	story	(Marwick,	2013;	Garcia	Martinez,
2016).	Global	celebrities	enjoy	their	global	status	as	a	function	of	‘superstar	effects’	which	preclude	all	but	a	small	number	reaching	this	status.	Digitalisation	has
facilitated	the	possibility	of	dominating	what	is	for	the	first	time	a	genuinely	global	cultural	marketplace,	but	the	economic	rewards	are	distributed	in	a	winner-
takes-most	fashion	[8].	A	figure	like	Lady	Gaga,	who	earned	US$170	million	through	137	shows	performed	in	25	countries	over	the	space	of	a	year,	represents
an	obvious	beneficiary	of	this	process.
However,	the	same	process	that	facilitates	this	global	audience	also	weakens	the	music	industry	as	a	whole.	As	Freedland	[9]	observed,	‘Cheap	and	effective
communication	has	allowed	a	few	performers	to	achieve	global	celebrity	more	quickly	and	at	a	greater	scale	than	ever’,	but	it	has	done	so	in	a	way	which
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concurs	with	a	contraction	of	the	opportunities	available	to	aspirants	within	these	fields,	as	well	as	in	some	ways	directly	intensifying	this	process.	The	rewards
available	to	those	able	to	achieve	recognition	as	the	‘best’	within	their	field	are	greater	than	ever,	while	the	opportunities	available	to	aspirants	within	these	fields
are	contracting,	in	some	cases	precipitously.
Under	these	conditions,	the	demand	for	desirable	career	paths	vastly	outstrips	the	supply.	This	trend	has	been	compounded	since	the	crisis	as	financial	necessity
has	led	increasing	numbers	into	freelancing	as	a	matter	of	necessity,	as	well	as	second-jobbing	or	multiple-jobbing	as	they	struggle	to	pursue	their	aspirations
(Conor,	et	al.,	2015;	Taylor,	2015).	The	rapid	expansion	of	digital	employment	platforms	in	the	so-called	‘gig	economy’	suggest	a	significant	expansion	of	such
precarious	autonomy,	rather	than	its	diminution	(Dyer-Witheford,	2015;	Scholz,	2013).	The	future	looks	bleak	for	many,	and	we	are	arguing	that	novel	forms	of
life	project	—	such	as	the	aspiration	to	become	a	celebrity	live	streamer	—	should	be	investigated	in	these	terms.
In	relation	to	this	increasingly	foreclosed	future,	it	becomes	significant	that	digital	communications	and	social	media	have	profoundly	expanded	the	means
through	which	one	can	seek	to	‘be	seen’:	as	Marwick	[10]	points	out,	‘[b]efore	the	Internet	a	prospective	self-brander	was	limited	to	putting	up	fliers	at	grocery
stores,	knocking	on	neighbours’	doors,	buying	advertisements	in	the	local	paper,	or	attending	potentially	inaccessible	industry	only	events’.	To	ensure	one’s	own
visibility,	cultivate	a	public	image	and	seek	to	ensure	that	image	is	received	in	the	intended	way	is	straight-forwardly	much	more	viable	than	was	previously	the
case:	there	are	more	means	through	which	to	do	it,	there	is	often	little	cost	involved	[11]	and	the	platforms	in	use	have	become	taken	for	granted	parts	of
everyday	life.
With	this	said,	we	must	also	recognise	how,	as	Gregg	(2011)	puts	it,	‘social	media	were	sold	as	the	solution	to	the	problems	of	the	contemporary	workplace’,
with	the	discourse	of	self-branding	presented	as	‘career	protection	in	uncertain	times’.	The	problem	arises	because	‘[e]ven	uniqueness	starts	to	sound	the	same
when	everyone	is	trying	to	perform	it’,	and	‘Brand	You’	was	‘never	conceived	for	a	mass	audience,	not	to	mention	a	time	when	every	other	mid-ranked
knowledge	worker	was	competing	for	a	dwindling	number	of	jobs’	(Gregg,	2011).	This	intensifying	dilemma	within	the	working	world	constitutes	a	broader	moral
economy	in	which	‘being	seen’	becomes	progressively	more	important	while	it	becomes	increasingly	difficult	to	stand	out	from	a	crowd	of	similarly	oriented
others.	It	is	within	this	context	that	we	now	address	the	live	streaming	of	video	games	and	the	aspiration	to	become	a	celebrity	streamer	as:	1)	an	escape	from
contemporary	working	conditions	for	young	people,	and	2)	an	extreme	example	of	the	economic	and	cultural	impetus	towards	self-propelled	visibility.
	
The	psychology	of	play	and	its	politico-economic	context
In	order	to	begin	understanding	the	appeal	of	turning	to	play	as	one’s	career,	we	need	to	look	at	the	psychology	of	play	and	the	broader	context	regarding
leisure,	labour	and	the	use	of	one’s	time,	with	which	it	is	interwoven.	In	psychology,	play	is	often	defined	in	terms	of	its	internality:	intrinsic	rewards	that	have	to
do	with	one’s	own	personal	development,	such	as	the	desire	to	overcome	an	obstacle,	find	a	meaningful	philosophy	for	life,	or	simply	enjoy	one’s	use	of	time
(Deci,	1975).	In	recent	years,	however,	it	has	been	suggested	that	we	are	witnessing	the	decline	of	play	for	these	intrinsic	reasons,	particularly	as	young	people
increasingly	turn	to	extrinsic	goals	as	a	locus	of	control	(Gray,	2010).	Extrinsic	goals	are	those	that	have	to	do	with	material	rewards	and	other	people’s
normative	judgments:	they	include	goals	of	high	income,	status	as	well	as	attractive	looks	or	favorable	personality	traits.	It	has	been	argued	that	this	focus
towards	externality	is	attributable	to	generational	increases	in	anxiety	and	depression,	particularly	as	children	and	young	people	find	it	harder	to	establish	an
internal	locus	of	control	(Twenge,	2010).
In	other	words,	a	culture	of	materialism	has	ushered	in	a	decline	in	the	‘free	activity’	of	play,	which	by	definition	affords	young	people	with	opportunities	for
introspection,	and	to	establish	a	sense	of	self-control	over	their	own	interests	and	competencies.	Without	it,	they	become	reliant	on	the	assurances	of	others	—
particularly	adults	who	establish	external	goals	on	their	behalf,	but	also	the	judgements	of	those	on	social	media	and	beyond	—	as	to	the	value	of	their	‘play’.
Parents	also	tend	to	have	a	limited	knowledge	of	gaming	careers	(Jiow,	et	al.,	2018),	although	some	are	aware	of	the	employment	options	in	the	field,	and	the
associated	kinds	of	work	and	dedication	they	can	require.
Many	games	(whether	or	not	streamed	on	Twitch,	our	central	case	study)	operate	in	a	similar	manner.	They	provide	an	external	locus	of	control	which	players
supposedly	consume	in	order	to	actualise	a	sense	of	‘individualized,	episodic	progress’	(Molesworth	and	Watkins,	2014).	What	this	means	is	that	many	games
are	designed	and	developed	to	encourage	repetitive	acts	that	help	players	experience	a	sense	of	control	and	achievement	(Grodal,	2000).	These	experiences
then	provide	working	people	with	an	escape	from	‘real’	life	through	the	establishment	of	ever-more	productive	virtual	identities:	what	Kirkpatrick	(2013),
paraphrasing	Boltanski	and	Chiapello,	calls	the	‘streamlined	gamer’.
Viewed	in	this	way,	commercial	games	are	seen	to	provide	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	productive	lifestyles.	Young	gamers	spend	their	days	collecting	items,
power-ups,	and	experience	points	with	the	intention	of	becoming	ever	more	powerful	and	controlling	ever	more	successful	avatars.	They	find	ways	to	become
efficient	producers	for	the	realm	or	world	in	which	they	inhabit,	often	racing	against	the	clock	to	collect	the	most	resources,	defeat	their	competition,	or	accrue
other	metrics	of	digital	success.	The	prospect	of	‘celebrity	streamer’	as	a	life	project	finds	normative	grounding	in	this	disposition,	while	still	being	reliant	on
02/08/2019 Johnson
https://ﬁrstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/8279/8058 4/15
other	factors	to	explain	its	elaboration	into	a	life	project.	For	a	deeper	history	of	the	relationship	between	video	game	media	and	the	activities	of	their	players	as
mediated	by	live	streaming,	see	Taylor	(2018);	but	our	interest	here	is	in	drawing	out	the	practices	of	streamers	on	Twitch	to	consider	the	moral	imperatives
which	underscore	them,	especially	regarding	the	need	to	be	seen	and	its	connections	to	neoliberalism,	time	and	productivity.
It	should	now	be	obvious	that	these	dispositions	also	provide	an	affective	ground	state	for	the	same	skills	demanded	by	a	neoliberal	political	economy.	Workers
are	expected	to	undertake	repetitive	tasks,	often	at	short	notice,	and	with	the	intention	of	maximizing	their	productivity	to	‘win’	—	that	is,	be	the	most	efficient
—	within	a	competitive	setting.	Perhaps	Wark	(2007)	describes	it	best	when	they	suggest	that	commercial	games	are	analogous	to	the	rat-race	that
characterises	neoliberal	capitalism:	players	are	carefully	attuned	to	the	idea	that	whilst	the	system	is	precarious	[12],	as	long	as	they	play	their	best,	they	will
always	have	a	chance	at	winning.	Discussion	surrounding	games	as	a	whole	increasingly	acknowledge	that	playful	activities	are	being	enlisted	to	‘do	work’
(Walker,	2014),	and	as	such	the	professionalization	of	computer	gaming	should	be	seen	as	operating	in	a	similar	manner:	offering	those	with	the	skills	of	good
gameplay	a	glimmer	of	hope	within	a	market	that	is	excessively	competitive	and	financially	insecure	(Taylor,	2012;	Bayliss,	2016).
This	is	very	much	the	case	in	live	streaming,	where	broadcasters	who	aspire	to	success	not	only	need	to	be	autonomous	and	instrumental	in	the	ways	that	they
mediate	the	competing	demands	of	this	market,	but	must	align	themselves	with	neoliberal	entrepreneurialism	if	they	are	to	succeed	(Johnson	and	Woodcock,
2017).	The	aspirational	player-and-streamer	must	find	ways	to	exploit	the	emerging	economic	opportunities	that	professional	gaming	affords,	including
connecting	themselves	with	corporate	sponsors,	and	investors	(Woodcock	and	Johnson,	in	press).	From	this	perspective,	when	play	becomes	an	extrinsic	reward,
its	values	may	be	considered	‘corrupted’	(to	borrow	from	Brock,	2017),	as	its	motivation	becomes	purely	instrumental:	a	question	of	directed	labour	that	leads	to
revenue	(Sotamaa,	2007),	rather	than	a	question	of	undirected	leisure.
It	is	therefore	clear	that	the	move	into	professional	play	as	an	extension	of	the	precarious	circumstances	that	feed	the	contraction	of	employment	opportunities
in	older	forms	of	work.	Play	in	the	digital	economy	is	not	always	liberating,	but	on	the	contrary,	can	compound	the	motivation	of	neoliberal	capitalism	to
orientate	its	subjects	towards	extrinsic,	that	is,	productive	goals.	Where	this	game	is	presented	as	a	level-playing	field,	within	which	anyone	can	participate,	the
reality	is	quite	different.
With	the	conflicting	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	values	of	play	in	our	contemporary	cultural-economic	context	established,	the	next	section	of	this	paper	will	describe
Twitch	and	live	streaming	in	more	detail,	contextualising	our	later	discussion	of	these	dynamics.	As	the	clear	market	leader	in	live	broadcasting,	Twitch	(the
platform)	has	become	all	but	synonymous	with	live	streaming	(the	practice),	and	analysis	of	one	is	impossible	without	the	other.
	
Live	broadcast	and	the	growth	of	Twitch.tv
We	therefore	now	come	to	explore	live	streaming	itself,	and	setting	the	groundwork	to	understand	the	celebrity	dynamics	manifested	on	the	platform	within	the
contexts	of	capitalism	and	extrinsic	play	previously	outlined.	Twitch.tv	is	a	Web	site	that	enables	video	game	players	from	around	the	world	to	broadcast	their
gameplay,	live,	to	a	theoretically	unlimited	number	of	people.	This	live	element	distinguishes	it	from	video	sharing	site	YouTube,	which	—	although	YouTube	has
a	rarely-used	live	function	—	is	overwhelmingly	focused	on	the	uploading	of	previously-recorded	video	content.	Equally,	while	gaming	is	one	of	the	most	viewed
segments	of	YouTube,	gaming	dominates	on	Twitch,	with	all	but	the	smallest	handful	of	live	streamers	focusing	on	digital	(and	in	some	rarer	cases	analogue)
play.	Recently	purchased	by	Amazon	for	US$1bn,	in	the	last	five	years	it	has	become	the	world’s	30th	most	visited	Web	site,	with	over	500,000	years	of	video
broadcast	by	around	two	million	broadcasters	in	each	of	the	last	several	years.	On	Twitch,	anyone	who	wishes	to	‘stream’	their	gameplay	creates	a	‘channel’	on
which	they	can	stream	any	game	content	they	desire	(within	a	small	number	of	content	restrictions	and	legal	requirements),	with	viewers	players	able	to	switch
rapidly	between	channels	whenever	desired	(Spilker,	et	al.,	2018).	Twitch	is	also,	of	course,	connected	in	diverse	ways	to	wider	ecosystems	of	game	production
and	game	consumption	(Taylor,	2018;	Johnson	and	Woodcock,	2019),	although	these	are	beyond	our	discussion	here.
The	most	basic	stream	simply	shows	the	game	being	played	by	the	player,	giving	viewers	the	exact	same	vision	of	the	game	as	the	player	themselves	gets	on
their	computer	screen.	A	slightly	more	complex	streaming	setup	will	consist	of	two	components	—	the	game	being	broadcast,	and	a	webcam	showing	the	person
playing	the	game.	This	allows	viewers	to	see	the	person	commentating	over	the	game,	to	observe	their	facial	reactions,	and	potentially	to	see	something	of	the
room	they	broadcast	from,	their	microphone	and	so	forth.	More	sophisticated	streaming	setups	can	include	a	bespoke	graphical	layout	within	which	the	game
and	webcam	are	positioned,	hyperlinks	to	the	streamer’s	social	media	profiles,	various	trackers	that	monitor	recent	donations	or	how	many	viewers	have
‘subscribed’	to	the	channel	today	(Johnson	and	Woodcock,	in	press),	or	textual	information	about	the	channel	such	as	the	streamer’s	schedule	or	the	name	of	the
game	they	are	currently	playing.
Twitch	channels	also	vary	immensely	in	size,	therefore	creating	a	wide	spectrum	of	audience	sizes	that	a	streamer	can	influence	on	Twitch.	The	smallest
streamers	have	only	a	handful	of	viewers	at	any	one	moment,	whilst	the	most	successful	celebrity	streamers	can	reliably	bring	in	tens	of	thousands	of	viewers
every	time	they	broadcast.	On	larger	channels,	streamers	—	as	we	will	see	later	—	have	developed,	both	alongside	Twitch	and	under	their	own	initiative,	a	range
02/08/2019 Johnson
https://ﬁrstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/8279/8058 5/15
of	methods	for	monetizing	and	gaining	profit	from	their	channels.	This	has	got	to	the	point	that	celebrity	streamers	are	now	able	to	make	a	full-time	living,	in
many	cases	an	income	substantially	above	minimum-wage,	from	playing	video	games	and	broadcasting	this	play	online	(Johnson	and	Woodcock,	2017).
At	first	glance,	therefore,	Twitch	appears	to	be	an	exemplary	platform	for	those	who	want	to	have	a	career	‘doing	what	they	love’	(if	that	is	playing	video
games),	which	brings	with	it	the	appeal	of	thousands	or	even	millions	of	viewers,	substantial	income,	and	personality	celebrity	visibility	within	a	rapidly-growing
new	form	of	media	production.	However,	just	from	this	description	we	can,	without	preempting	later	analysis,	immediately	begin	to	identify	a	number	of	potential
concerns.	For	example,	the	hard	and	extraordinarily	competitive	conditions	to	be	found	in	‘esports’	(‘electronic	sports’,	which	is	to	say	professionalised	video
game	competition)	such	as	those	explored	by	Dal	Yong	Jin	(2010)	and	T.L.	Taylor	(2012)	should	sensitise	us	to	the	kinds	inequalities	likely	to	emerge	here	along
lines	of	gender,	sexuality,	and	race.	These	are	spaces	that	strongly	reward	those	who	hold	to	a	hegemonic	white,	able-bodied,	heterosexual	masculinity,	and	can
be	challenging	to	negotiate	for	those	who	do	not.
In	turn,	the	easy	metricisation	of	‘success’	in	terms	of	follower	counts,	subscriptions	and	donations	is	an	example	of	what	van	Dijck	(2013)	calls	the	‘popularity
principle’:	the	architecture	of	the	platform	incites	participants	towards	become	‘more	successful’	as	operationalised	through	these	metrics	and	data	(cf.,	Partin,
2019).	Such	a	temptation	does	not	of	course	dictate	that	all	participants	approach	streaming	in	this	way	(cf.,	Archer,	2007),	but	we	can	see	encouragement	as
an	emergent	property	of	the	design,	inciting	participants	to	dispose	themselves	towards	the	pleasures	of	the	platform	in	a	specific	range	of	ways.	What	is	striking
about	the	case	of	streaming	is	how	the	criteria	through	which	we	might	perform	assessments	of	competence	or	ability,	towards	ourselves	or	others,	find
themselves	naturalised	within	the	architecture	of	the	platform	itself	(Marres	and	Gerlitz,	2016;	Marres,	2017;	Rogers,	2013).
By	isolating	these	criteria,	in	which	personal	‘success’	and	platform	‘popularity’	tend	towards	being	conflated	[13],	we	can	begin	to	ask	wider	questions	about	the
social	and	economic	conditions	under	which	such	an	intensely	metricised	pursuit	comes	to	be	perceived	as	worthwhile	to	subjects	and	as	a	potential	contributor
to	their	well-being	(Sayer,	2011).
Having	outlined	Twitch	and	posed	questions	about	the	dynamics	of	labour	and	celebrity	that	might	be	present	on	the	platform,	we	now	look	to	analyze	its	unique
dynamics	of	activity	and	behaviour,	its	appeal	to	young	people,	and	the	new	careers	and	forms	of	celebrity	it	has	enabled.	To	do	so	we	will	intertwine	further
discussion	of	the	platform	with	further	analysis	of	our	contemporary	socioeconomic	conditions.	Specifically,	three	elements	of	our	earlier	discussion	demand	our
particular	attention	in	the	subsequent	analysis.
Firstly,	the	newfound	ubiquity	of	highly	public	hagiographies	of	‘independent’,	‘self-motivated’	and	‘disruptive’	celebrity	individuals	across	a	range	of	employment
fields,	who	are	praised	for	their	abilities	to	transcend	ordinary	career	paths	and	become	highly	visible	in	their	respective	areas	(Aschoff,	2015).
Secondly,	the	concurrent	actual	contraction	of	such	opportunities,	especially	for	young	people,	and	the	rise	of	a	system	which	emphasises	the	need	to	advertise
one’s	abilities	and	optimise	one’s	time	in	the	pursuit	of	fame	alongside	or	as	an	alternative	to	traditional	forms	of	labour	(Gregg,	2011;	Standing,	2011).	With	so
many	professional	gamers	in	their	twenties,	we	should	pay	particular	attention	to	the	status	of	professional	game-players	as	‘young	adults	and	early	labourers’
[14],	with	these	demographic	markers	significantly	shaping	their	experiences.
Thirdly,	with	the	increasing	pooling	of	wealth	and	power	in	smaller	and	smaller	circles,	the	presence	of	disproportionate	rewards	available	to	those	who	are	able
to	reach	such	heights;	it	is	against	the	background	of	this	winner-takes-all	economy	that	the	aspiration	towards	celebrity	increases	in	salience	as	a	life	project
(Hacker	and	Pierson,	2010),	and	can	be	seen	reflected	in	a	significant	percentage	of	the	two	million	regular	broadcasters	on	Twitch.
The	promise	incipient	within	the	emerging	moral	economy	of	digital	capitalism	rests	on	such	a	contradiction	between	the	normalised	aspiration	for	such	heights,
and	the	impossibility	of	those	heights	for	all	but	the	smallest	number,	and	it	is	to	how	this	promise	plays	out	on	Twitch	to	which	we	now	turn.
	
Competitive	performance	through	Twitch	architecture
As	we	have	already	noted,	there	are	several	million	channels	on	Twitch,	with	an	average	of	two	million	individuals	broadcasting	from	their	channels	every	month.
No	precise	figures	exist	on	the	number	of	professionals	within	this	number	due	to	both	the	lack	of	data	collection	and	the	inevitable	terminological	ambiguity
about	the	concept	of	the	‘professional	streamer’	(one’s	primary	income,	or	sole	income,	or	some	other	metric?),	but	at	least	a	few	thousand	individuals	(Johnson
and	Woodcock,	2017)	are	able	to	meet	their	full	economic	life	requirements	through	Twitch	streaming,	although	a	much	larger	number	(at	least	tens	of
thousands)	make	a	meaningful	additional	income	from	the	practice.	This	number	is	growing	as	the	service	continues	to	grow,	and	as	Twitch	continue	to	add	new
ways	for	broadcasters	to	generate	revenue	(Partin,	in	press;	Johnson	and	Woodcock,	in	press).
In	principle,	all	streamers	start	from	the	same	point	as	being	unknown	and	un-viewed.	Although	many	successful	streamers	had	successful	careers	elsewhere
(such	as	within	professional	competitive	gaming,	or	on	YouTube	prior	to	moving	to	Twitch)	[15],	other	big	names	had	no	fame	prior	to	their	Twitch	careers,	an
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observation	that	does	much	to	implicitly	encourage	new	aspirational	streamers.	All	face	comparable	mundane	challenges	in	terms	of	the	investment	of	time
required	to	have	any	chance	of	achieving	visibility	(Wacjman,	2015),	privileging	those	able	to	rely	on	familial	resources	in	a	manner	homologous	with	the	intern
system	(Perlin,	2012).	It	is	one	thing	to	stream	is	one’s	spare	time,	but	quite	another	to	have	the	existing	security	to	prioritise	streaming	for	weeks,	months,
maybe	even	years,	without	it	yet	becoming	profitable.
However,	reaching	the	apex	of	success	requires	differentiation	from	the	masses	of	other	players	somehow,	and	in	studying	these	methods	of	differentiation	we
will	observe	the	precariousness	of	such	labour	in	a	world	where	streamers	have	approximately	a	one-in-a-thousand	chance	[16]	of	achieving	a	career	through
these	means	(cf.,	Guarriello,	2019).
All	streamers	who	broadcast	as	anything	more	than	a	leisure	activity	compete	to	commodify	their	streaming	time	(cf.,	Sotamaa,	2007),	become	the	most	visible,
and	thereby	the	most	financially	successful.	We	propose	that	there	are	two	distinctive	forms	of	streamer	competition,	which	we	identify	as	being	‘community’
competition,	and	‘general’	competition.	We	begin	with	the	former.	Two	illustrative	examples	of	community	competition	can	be	found	amongst	‘speedrunners’	and
poker	streamers.	Speedrunning	is	the	practice	of	‘completing	a	game	as	quickly	as	possible	without	the	use	of	cheats’	(Scully-Blaker,	2014).	Speedrunning
communities	have	created	detailed	leaderboards	for	the	practice,	and	although	speedrunning	took	place	before	the	advent	of	Twitch,	it	is	only	in	the	last	five
years	that	it	—	like	all	streaming	more	broadly	—	has	risen	in	popularity	and	importance.
Many	speedrun	streamers	pull	in	thousands	of	regular	viewers	consistently,	but	a	higher-level	overview	of	speedrunning	practice	in	the	last	five	years	on	Twitch
shows	clear	fluctuating	interest	in	streamers	based	on	their	current	successes	in	speedrunning	a	particular	game.	As	leaderboards	change	so	too	do	the	players
who	are	watched	and	thereby	generate	income,	and	thus	players	are	pushed	towards	the	labour	required	to	acquire	world	records	in	these	highly-competitive
games.
Although	not	a	‘video	game’	in	the	traditional	sense,	there	are	also	numerous	streamers	on	Twitch	who	broadcast	their	real-money	play	on	online	poker	sites,
with	the	stream	on	a	delay	of	several	minutes	in	order	to	avoid	their	competitors	simply	opening	the	stream	in	order	to	see	their	cards.	In	the	last	two	years	an
informal	competition	has	emerged	between	these	streamers,	who	are	normally	either	professional	poker	players	or	former	professionals,	to	see	who	can	win	the
most	live	on	stream	in	a	single	session.
At	time	of	writing,	the	largest	‘cash’	to	date	is	around	US$450,000	of	real	money	won	in	a	single	session,	but	it	seems	unlikely	this	competition	will	cease	any
time	soon.	The	streamer	who	achieved	this	received	greater	visibility	than	he	had	previously	enjoyed	and	seems	to	have	benefited	from	this	fame.	The
relationship	between	celebrity	and	wealth	is	clear	in	this	example,	where	the	two	reinforce	one	another	through	poker	profits	boosting	channel	visibility,	and
channel	visibility	boosting	income.	The	rich	become	richer	(cf.,	Freeland,	2012)	because	prior	success	is	such	a	potent	resource	to	be	leveraged	into
differentiating	oneself	further	in	the	pursuit	of	more	success.
However,	streaming	nevertheless	maintains	the	enticing	possibility	of	instant	success	for	anybody,	and	being	catapulted	into	that	highest	echelon	of	most	visible,
and	most	financially	well-off,	broadcasters.	Tracking	leaderboards	in	speedrunning	or	tracking	profit	earned	in	a	single	session	on	poker	both	represent	the
metricisation	of	success	noted	by	van	Dijck	(2013).	By	managing	to	rise	to	the	top	of	these	metrics,	even	previously	unknown	streamers	can	rapidly	become
disruptive	and	visible	celebrities	who	rapidly	rise	from	nothing	to	sudden	substantial	fame	on	the	back	of	their	sudden	success	and	consequent	noteworthiness.
There	are	dozens,	or	perhaps	even	hundreds	of	communities	on	Twitch	of	this	sort,	all	of	which	have	their	share	of	superstars,	aspirants,	and	those	in	the
middle.	This	enables	streamers	to	pursue	visibility	through	various	paths	—	yet	all	are,	nevertheless,	competitive.
	
Digital	celebrity	and	competitive	work	personas
Given	the	challenge	of	attaining	high	status,	the	relevant	cultural	question	however	is	how	and	why	such	outliers	—	the	successful,	professional	streamers	—
come	to	be	(mis)represented	as	a	potential	norm?	Celebrity	is	an	inherently	untenable	aspiration	when	it	is	collective	pursued.	As	Goffman	[17]	wrote,	by	‘fame’
we	‘refer	to	the	possibility	that	the	circle	of	people	who	know	about	a	given	individual,	especially	in	connection	with	a	rare	desirable	achievement	or	possession,
can	become	very	wide,	and	at	the	same	time	much	wider	than	the	circle	of	those	who	know	him	personally.’	By	definition	only	a	handful	of	people	within	a	field
can	enjoy	fame	in	this	sense,	and	the	competitive	dynamics	of	differentiation	mean	the	‘price	of	entry’	is	continually	rising.	This	means	that	‘building	a
commodifiable	work	persona’	[18]	is	an	essential	part	of	the	streaming	process,	because	‘digital	profile	management	has	become	integral	labour	in	its	own	right’
[19].	Such	management	entails	not	just	the	cultivation	of	fame	but	presenting	an	image	of	fame	and	success	as	appropriate,	earned,	and	so	forth.
Moving	beyond	specific	communities	to	consider	streamers	as	a	whole	and	what	we	call	general	competition,	numerous	methods	have	emerged	for	boosting	the
visibility	and	profitability	of	one’s	Twitch	channel.	Firstly,	some	have	come	to	undertake	particular	stream	challenges,	such	as	streaming	for	long	volumes	of
time,	as	a	method	for	gaining	interest	in	their	streams.	A	24-hour	stream	to	celebrate	some	special	event	—	a	round-number	of	subscribers	or	followers,	or	the
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release	of	a	new	game	particularly	relevant	to	the	streamer	—	is	not	uncommon.	Some	streamers	have	even	gone	further	and	48-hour	streams	have	been
known	to	take	place.	Such	‘extreme’	and	transgressive	practices	that	undermine	the	assumptions	of	a	normal	working	day	even	more	than	Twitch	does	ordinarily
are	increasingly	common	methods	for	gaining	particular	attention,	and	notoriety,	amongst	streaming	viewers.	These	are	a	form	of	‘representational	labour’	[20]
which	is	designed	to	show	viewers	the	reliability	of	a	particular	streamer,	the	interest	of	their	channel,	and	therefore	the	sense	in	tuning	in	to	their	broadcast	as
opposed	to	those	of	others.
This	escalation	of	competition	compounds	the	practical	challenges	posed	by	celebrity	streaming	as	a	life	strategy,	with	the	price	paid	in	order	to	stand	a	chance
of	‘being	seen’	tending	to	rise	continually	due	to	the	logic	inherent	in	the	architecture	of	the	platform	itself.	As	Striphas	(2015)	noted,	many	social	media
platforms	are	presented	as	a	democratization	of	culture.	However,	as	a	result	of	how	all	algorithms	function,	which	is	to	say	the	opaque	sorting	and	prioritization
of	data,	we	are	left	with	a	‘mystification’	of	culture	into	a	black	box	we	lack	access	to,	and	the	contraction	of	culture	into	what	is	deemed	preferable	by	a	large
‘crowd’	—	a	crowd	which,	in	actual	fact,	is	an	algorithm.	Twitch	has	deployed	a	range	of	methods	for	gaining	publicity	for	new	streamers,	and	has	employees
whose	jobs	are	specifically	to	identify	and	nurture	those	with	the	potential	to	‘go	pro’	(become	professional	streamers),	but	these	valuable	attempts	at	a	healthy
and	ordered	kind	of	support	nevertheless	exist	alongside	the	ever-present	potential	to	boost	one’s	publicity	by	other	means.
To	turn	to	the	above	examples	of	streaming	practice,	it	goes	without	saying	that	remaining	awake	for	such	periods	of	time	is	not	healthy.	The	competition	on
Twitch	is	so	fierce	that	it	can	potentially	be	challenging	to	mental	and	physical	health	(Johnson,	2018),	but	such	risks	are	—	for	some	streamers	—	part	of	the
one-upmanship	of	broadcast	competition.	Twitch	is	very	clear	in	not	endorsing	this	practice,	but	does	not	explicitly	prevent	the	existence	of	long	streams.	More
strictly	managed	is	the	(declining)	tendency	for	some	streamers	—	predominantly	female,	but	also	male	—	to	attempt	to	recruit	viewers	to	their	stream	by
showing	a	lot	of	flesh.	In	the	case	of	men	this	meant	physically	fit	streaming	shirtless,	and	in	the	case	of	women	it	meant	streaming	with	only	a	bra	on	one’s
upper	body,	or	a	very	low-cut	top	and	an	appropriately	angled	webcam.	The	current	stricter	rules	are	still	navigated	by	streamers	pursuing	these	strategies,	but
are	more	restrictive	than	they	once	were.
All	of	this	is	what	Goffman	(1959)	calls	a	‘cynical	performance’	—	the	use	of	ploys	to	gain	advantage	over	a	consumer.	Irrespective	of	any	concerns	around	such
choices,	we	can	clearly	see	this	behavior	—	and	its	unplanned	emergence	through	the	collective	ideas	of	broadcasters	—	as	the	kind	of	independent	‘striking	out’
discussed	earlier,	whereby	streamers	wishing	to	differentiate	themselves	from	the	millions	of	competitors	have	to	find	something	unique	they	can	offer	that	other
streamers	and	their	channels	cannot,	even	if	it	comes	with	its	own	risks	and	concerns.
Given	the	extreme	competition	likely	to	ensue	in	a	rapidly	growing	field	with	little	to	no	barriers	to	entry,	it	is	possible	that	these	practices	are	but	a	foretaste	of
things	to	come.	Again	we	see	the	tension	within	digital	capitalism’s	moral	economy,	as	a	celebration	of	individual	‘success’	goes	hand-in-hand	with	cut-throat
competition	which	leaves	self-subordination	deemed	a	worthwhile	practice	by	many	(Wark,	2007).
	
Time,	productivity	and	neoliberalism
Nevertheless,	even	for	those	who	stream	‘healthily’	and/or	stream	within	the	limits	set	out	by	Twitch,	the	entrepreneurial	use	of	time	as	a	resource	remains
essential.	Successful	streamers	tend	to	be	very	constant	in	their	broadcast	timings	with	a	clear	and	unchanging	weekly	schedule;	they	tend	to	stream	regularly,
with	numerous	professional	streamers	running	a	show	on	their	channel	every	single	day	of	the	week	barring	unexpected	‘real	life’	occurrences.	These	two	forms
of	regularization	are	designed	to	teach	viewers	that	their	channel	will	broadcast	often	and	reliably,	and	to	maximise	the	impact	that	each	unit	of	time	spent
broadcasting	has:	the	more	one	broadcasts,	the	more	‘value’	each	broadcast	has	in	boosting	visibility,	as	well	as	all	broadcasts	together	serving	to	boost
visibility,	in	a	snowballing	effect.	The	temporal	autonomy	necessary	for	such	activity	runs	contrary	to	a	prevailing	state	of	‘non-stop	inertia’	experienced	by	those
who	are	unemployed	or	under-employed	(Southwood,	2011).	The	regular	exercise	of	reflexivity	relating	to	one’s	use	of	time	is	an	important	factor	in	achieving
success.	But	the	prospects	for	this	are	limited	when	much	work	is	experienced	either	as	accelerated	or	as	slowly	exhaustive	of	temporal	resources	(Agger,	2004;
Sharma,	2014;	Rosa,	2013).
The	methods	by	which	streamers	monetise	their	streams	are	also	intriguing,	and	also	merit	elucidation	(Johnson	and	Woodcock,	in	press).	Twitch	streamers	can
be	broken	down	into	three	economic	categories:	those	who	stream	without	any	monetization	on	their	stream,	whether	Twitch’s	integrated	‘subscriber’	system	or
their	own	donation	systems	(cf.,	Jiow,	et	al.,	2018);	those	who	stream	with	monetization	but	do	not	make	enough	money	to	stream	as	their	primary	income;
and	those	whose	streams	are	monetised	and	successful	enough	to	bring	in	enough	money	to	live	off.	As	noted	at	the	start	of	the	paper,	any	stream	that	is
attempting	to	monetise	itself	will	rarely	consist	of	only	live	gameplay.	Most	will	contain	live	webcams,	extra	textual	information,	a	custom	layout	and	visual
aesthetic,	and	text	that	automatically	updates	for	a	new	followers,	or	—	when	a	channel	is	more	popular	—	a	new	subscriber.	These	make	streams	look	more
professional	and	bring	a	clear	neoliberal	entrepreneurial	dimension	to	the	practice	by	monetising	acts	of	self-work	(Dardot	and	Larval,	2013).
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Subscriptions	and	donations	are	two	of	the	primary	methods	by	which	streamers	earn	their	income,	and	in	both	cases	streamers	have	found	resourceful	ways	to
maximise	the	inclination	of	viewers	to	give	the	money	through	these	two	different	avenues.	Some	streamers	come	up	with	unique	collective	nouns	for	their
groups	of	subscribers	(‘the	wolf	pack’,	‘the	army’,	‘the	freedom	fighters’,	‘the	nerds’),	whilst	others	perform	special	things	when	someone	subscribes,	such	as
placing	a	pin	on	a	physical	world	map	in	their	room	with	the	streamer’s	location,	saying	something	special	including	the	subscriber’s	name	or	another	action	that
can	only	be	‘triggered’	through	a	subscription	and	is	personalised	towards	the	specific	subscriber.	In	some	cases	a	special	sound	clip	will	play	from	a	particular
film,	piece	of	music	or	game.
Such	streamers	have	thereby	even	turned	the	act	of	giving	them	money	into	a	game	(Johnson	and	Woodcock,	in	press),	which	serves	as	another	form	of
interaction	between	the	streamer	and	their	viewers.	Some	channels	list	the	‘Top	Donator’	or	‘Latest	Subscriber’,	encouraging	viewers	to	donate	more,	or
subscribe,	in	order	to	have	their	name	displayed	on	screen	(until	it	is	trumped	once	more).	This	is	an	example	of	what	Chris	Rojek	(2015)	calls	‘presumed’	or
‘parasocial’	intimacy:	a	modern	version	of	what	Goffman	called	the	‘nod	counts’	of	the	familiar	stranger,	which	is	to	say	a	way	to	get	recognition	without	actually
getting	to	truly	know	the	person	on	an	intimate	or	empathetic	level.	In	this	way	streamers	transform	more	traditional	forms	of	human	interaction	into	a	form	of
revenue	generation,	with	surface-level	personalization	giving	a	sense	of	real	relationships	between	broadcaster	and	viewer(s).
Given	this	supposed	intimacy,	streamers	have	been	known	to	comment	on	social	media	outlets	on	the	paradoxical	relationship	they	have	with	their	viewers	who
both	feel	a	part	of	the	streamer’s	life	and	yet	remain	geographically	and	emotionally	distant,	and	the	concurrent	necessity	of	presenting	a	certain	intimacy	in
order	to	foster	the	connections	that	will	make	one	a	popular	streamer.	In	this	sense,	the	striving	of	the	aspirant	celebrity	stream	should	not	be	seen	as	lonely,
but	rather	as	intensely	connective,	if	not	necessarily	social	(van	Dijck,	2013).
There	is	therefore	a	wealth	of	systems	available	to	streamers,	under	their	own	stream	or	under	the	aegis	of	Twitch,	for	monetizing	their	broadcasted	gameplay
and	transforming	streaming	activities	into	‘productive’	labour	(Witkowski,	et	al.,	2016).	Although	each	of	these	methods	may	seem	trivial	by	itself,	the
combination	provides	two	things:	firstly,	a	number	of	ways	by	which	viewers	can	support	their	favourite	streamers,	offering	at	least	one	method	that	will
hopefully	appeal	to	each	viewer;	secondly,	what	we	might	understand	as	a	complete	collection	of	elements	a	viewer	can	‘collect’.	The	acquisition	of	one
encourages	the	acquisition	of	others,	and	this	is	thereby	somewhat	comparable	to	the	expansive	storytelling	of	transmedia	franchises	with	elements	of	the	same
fictional	world	being	relayed	across	a	wide	range	of	media	that	require	different	forms	of	engagement	or	expenditure	by	the	reader	(Long,	2007;	Scolari,	2009),
and	in	turn	the	broader	capitalistic	drive	towards	acquisition	in	general	and	specifically	the	acquisition	of	all	possible	game	content	within	other	virtual	worlds
(Buckingham	and	Sefton-Green,	2003).
The	greater	the	number	of	ways	to	engage	with	a	streamer,	the	greater	the	chance	that	a	given	viewer	will	engage	with	at	least	one,	and	that	having	done	so
they	will	be	inclined	to	engage	with	others.	Equally,	the	imperative	to	be	seen	reflected	in	all	of	these	practices	designed	to	maximise	visibility	and	viewer
retention	function	as	a	means	to	legitimating	the	system	these	practices	exist	within.	All	of	these	elements	combine	to	encourage	a	particular	kind	of	aspiration:
the	feeling	of	a	successful	performance,	and	the	instrumental	expectations	of	gaining	followers	and	thereby	earning	‘success’	on	a	granular	and	gradual	level.	As
such,	all	of	Twitch’s	quantified	modes	of	‘success’,	far	from	unique	to	streaming	platforms,	find	an	affinity	in	the	dispositions	of	late	modern	youth.
What,	however,	can	we	say	of	those	who	do	not	make	it?	As	we	have	noted,	the	future	for	many	appears	to	be	one	of	breaking	into	the	upper	echelons	of	their
career	of	choice,	or	accepting	a	working	life	without	the	forms	of	occupational	security	which	post-war	social	democracy	sought	to	achieve	[21].	As	one	new
element	of	this	trend	we	have	examined	the	methods	by	which	streamers	strive	for	the	small	apex	of	celebrity	and	full-time	income	available	with	the	highest
possible	success	upon	the	Twitch	platform.	However,	with	several	million	regular	streamers	and	only	thousands	of	partnered	streamers	—	only	a	percentage	of
whom	make	enough	to	quit	any	other	forms	of	income	—	we	might	ask:	what	happens	to	those	who	strive,	and	perform	all	the	steps	above,	but	still	don’t	‘make
it’?
It	is	clear	that	these	individuals	are	left	more	precarious	for	having	made	the	effort	but	failed.	This	effort	could	have	been	committed	to	other	forms	of
employment	or	skills	training	designed	to	make	them	more	employable,	but	by	committing	to	the	long	and	regular	hours,	and	the	substantial	mental	and
physical	commitment	of	a	streaming	career,	they	have	effectively	prevented	themselves	from	exploring	other	options.	The	optimizing	of	their	time	in	pursuit	of
fame	also	works	to	preclude	them	from	being	responsive	to	other	opportunities	and	employment	options,	a	core	part	of	the	discourses	of	contemporary
capitalism.	Pursuing	a	streaming	career	is	therefore	simultaneously	a	point	of	immense	potential	value	for	aspirants	and	one	with	few	formal	barriers	to	entry,
but	one	where	only	the	smallest	apex	of	streamers	achieve	that	level,	and	the	majority	are	left	with	fewer	alternate	options	than	they	had	before	their	striving
for	that	goal.	This	makes	live	streaming	an	exemplary	site	of	study	when	it	comes	to	the	employment	and	cultural	conditions	of	young	people	in	the	present
economic	climate,	and	how	the	pursuit	of	the	highest	success	intersects	with	the	challenge	of	achieving	any	career	security	at	all.
	
Conclusion
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This	paper	has	drawn	on	examples	of	video	game	live	streaming	in	the	digital	economy	to	conceptualise	the	moral	and	economic	imperatives	that	underwrite
(digital)	celebrity	today.	It	has	shown	how	‘fame’	operates	to	create	precarious	working	relations	within	the	digital	economy	through	the	frameworks	of
‘neoliberal	entrepreneurialism’	and	the	aspiration	for	‘celebrity’.	What	we	see	is	that	the	contraction	of	work	opportunities	in	traditional	sectors	of	work	(service
jobs)	prompts	a	move	into	the	digital	economy	as	a	coping	mechanism;	this	is	a	field	that	is	presented	as	egalitarian,	but	which	actually	obscures	power	relations
that	structurally	disadvantage	later	comers,	as	well	as	those	who	do	not	have	the	resources	needed	to	fit	the	imperative	to	be	seen.	Computers	have
fundamentally	altered	the	‘technological	processes	of	capital’	[22],	tilting	many	of	these	towards	highly-competitive,	celebrity-driven,	almost	monopolistic	(or	at
least	highly	exclusive)	forms	of	labour	such	as	live	streaming.	This,	in	tandem	with	the	overwhelming	youth	of	those	pursuing	it,	make	it	an	important	line	of
critical	enquiry.
It	is	difficult	to	politicise	the	power	relations	of	this	digital	political	economy,	as	the	language	of	contemporary	streamers	is	couched	in	moral	terms.	There	is	an
elective	affinity	between	the	life	project	of	the	aspirant	celebrity	steamer	and	a	cultural	blurring	of	the	boundaries	between	‘play’	and	‘work’.	The	former	is	a
process	facilitated	by	digitalization	and	incited	by	digital	capitalism,	while	the	latter	is	a	longer-term	change	that	manifests	on	a	number	of	levels,	not	least	of	all
in	the	changing	culture	of	workplaces	(Cederström	and	Fleming,	2012).	Political	economists	have	offered	alternative	ways	to	structure	and	organise	the	means
by	which	labour	is	financially	recompensed	online,	but	more	care	is	needed	in	tackling	its	moral	dimension	if	we	are	to	appropriately	address	the	systems	that
underwrite	digital	celebrity.
We	consequently	propose	two	primary	outcomes	from	this	paper.	Firstly,	we	have	presented	video	game	live	streaming	and	the	emergence	of	celebrity	from	the
practice	as	an	illustrative	case	study	of	the	broader	phenomena	outlined	in	the	previous	sections	with	regards	to	digital	celebrity,	neoliberal	aspiration	and	the
contraction	of	work	opportunities.	Given	the	growth	of	the	platform,	this	is	an	important	time	to	begin	understanding	these	wider	political	economic
entanglements	of	Twitch,	in	order	to	situate	future	analysis	as	live	streaming,	most	likely,	becomes	even	more	influential	and	therefore	an	even	more	appealing
career	path	for	many.	Secondly,	these	theoretical	orientations	help	us	to	understand	the	particular	culture	of	Twitch,	the	varied	range	of	performative
competitions	that	play	out	on	the	platform	and	some	of	the	more	striking	(and	even	potentially	damaging)	practices	that	streamers	partake	in	as	a	means	to	get
ahead.	The	platform	has	come	to	exemplify	numerous	elements	of	contemporary	competitive	labour	in	its	ordering	of	time,	bodies,	attitudes	and	efforts,	and
therefore	helps	us	understand	the	behaviours	of	those	who	do	decide	to	explore	this	income	path.
We	should	stress	that	Twitch	as	a	company	is	unambiguous	in	condemning,	or	at	least	not	endorsing,	the	various	controversial	or	potentially	damaging	working
practices	of	the	sorts	we	have	outlined	in	this	paper,	but	that	the	allure	of	digital	celebrity	and	the	process	by	which	celebrity	can	(supposedly)	be	attained	force
many	of	its	aspirant	users	into	competitive	spectacles	that	range	from	the	relatively	mundane	—	leaderboards,	high-score	competitions,	and	the	like	—	to	the
more	problematic.	Popular	discourses	surrounding	live	streaming	construct	it	as	‘fun’	yet	‘lucrative’,	and	it	is	these	discourses	that	generate	the	extreme	levels	of
competition,	and	extremely	rare	numbers	of	highest-level	success,	we	have	explored.
More	broadly	than	the	phenomenon	of	live	streaming,	the	relative	deprivation	of	many	young	people	under	contemporary	neoliberal	labour	conditions	is
compounded	by	the	disjuncture	between	their	education	levels	and	the	reality	of	the	work	available	to	them	[23],	with	many	young	people	reduced	to	mere
‘click-workers’	[24]	in	the	digital	economy.	Structural	questions	about	occupational	opportunities	are	increasingly	obscured	by	cultural	ones	concerning	individual
morality,	specifically	with	regard	to	the	level	of	work	and	effort	that	individuals	are	expected	to	put	in	in	order	to	climb	to	the	top.	Gerrard	(2014)	has	argued
that	education	and	training	become	important	moral	markers,	signaling	a	willingness	to	develop	the	self	in	order	to	better	fare	on	the	labour	market.	This	desire
for	self-improvement	and	in	turn	the	place	of	self-improvement	as	a	method	towards	fame	and	financial	success	finds	a	strong	outlet	in	the	world	of	video	game
live	streaming,	existing	as	it	does	within	a	domain	that	requires	no	formal	qualifications,	minimal	start-up	costs,	involves	the	play	of	leisure	activities	as	the
foundation	upon	which	such	a	career	will	be	built	(cf.,	Sotamaa,	2007;	Johnson	and	Woodcock,	2017),	and	has	the	demonstrated	capacity	to	result	in	six-figure
incomes	and	tremendous	levels	of	digital	fame.
These	elements	combine	to	offer	a	(very	obvious)	appeal,	which	in	turn	leads	to	the	particular	streaming	phenomena	outlined	in	this	work,	reinforced	by	the
affordances	and	structures	of	streaming	Web	sites.	Bauman	(2004)	has	dramatically	proclaimed	an	epochal	shift	in	which	‘unemployed’	as	a	fleeting	condition
has	given	way	to	‘redundancy’	as	a	perpetual	possibility;	streaming	seems	to	offer	not	just	a	way	out	of	such	a	situation,	but	a	way	to	actively	turn	one’s	spare
(or	redundant)	time	to	career	benefit	without	prerequisite	training	or	substantial	investment.	It	has	consequently	become	a	distinctive	and	hotly-contested	new
source	of	digital	celebrity,	and	one	that	brings	with	it	particular	dynamics	and	practices	that	merit	our	scholarly	attention.	
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Notes
1.	We	understand	‘moral	economy’	in	terms	of	the	mutual	imbrication	of	the	‘moral’	and	the	‘economic’.	In	our	case	study,	this	helps	us	identify	the	relation
between	a	particular	kind	of	moral	form	(the	aspiration	towards	streaming	celebrity)	to	a	particular	kind	of	context	(the	austerian	‘death	of	the	future’).
Furthermore,	this	is	a	relation	facilitated	by	socio-technical	innovations	that	are	themselves	deeply	implicated	in	socio-economic	transformation.	Thus	the
question	of	what	matters	to	someone,	as	well	as	how	it	comes	to	matter,	can	be	a	frame	through	which	to	explore	much	broader	questions	of	social	and
economic	change	(Sayer,	2011).
2.	See	for	instance	Harvey	(2005),	Mirowski	(2013)	and	Srnicek	and	Williams	(2015).
3.	Attempting	to	cope	in	this	sense	implies	the	formulation	of	plans	and	projects,	no	matter	how	untenable	or	unlikely	some	of	them	may	be	(Archer,	2007).
However,	the	exigencies	of	daily	life	under	some	circumstances	may	preclude	coping	in	this	sense,	as	the	day-to-day	challenge	of	survival	precludes	much	of	the
future-orientated	thinking	we	discuss	here,	at	least	for	tracts	of	time	when	someone	struggles	to,	for	instance,	secure	shelter	(Desmond,	2016;	Judah,	2016).
4.	A	description	we	use	to	designate	the	emerging	phase	of	capitalism	in	which	digitalisation	has	left	finance	beyond	the	direct	control	of	financiers,	transformed
the	experience	of	everyday	life,	established	the	ascendancy	of	data	capital	and	characterised	by	a	growing	domination	by	a	small	number	of	expansionary	and
increasingly	oligopolistic	technology	firms	(Archer,	2014;	Lewis,	2015;	van	Dijck,	2013;	Wajcman,	2015).
5.	Sassen,	2014,	loc	373–388.
6.	Freedland,	2012,	p.	120.
7.	This	is	Peter	Thiel’s	(2014)	term,	offered	as	someone	who	has	been	a	beneficiary	of	the	initial	dot	com	boom	(1998–2000)	and	the	subsequent	‘Web	2.0’
boom	that	gave	rise	to	social	media.	The	norm	that	figures	such	as	Thiel	enter	venture	capital,	something	made	possible	by	their	earlier	successes,	illustrates	the
intensively	winner-takes-all	dynamics	of	digital	capitalism.
8.	Marres,	2017,	p.	61.
9.	Freedland,	2012,	pp.	108–109.
10.	Marwick,	2013,	p.	185.
11.	In	the	sense	of	fees	for	access	to	goods	and	services,	as	opposed	to	the	vast	quantified	of	unpaid	labour	entailed	by	such	self-branding	activities.
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12.	Zolides,	2015,	p.	44.
13.	Recognising	that	streamers	are	not	passively	moulded	by	systemic	imperatives	opens	up	an	important	range	of	empirical	questions.	How	are	these	metrics
understood	at	the	everyday	level	of	what	Couldry	(2014)	calls	‘social	analytics’?	How	do	orientations	towards	them	vary	at	different	points	in	the	careers	of
streamers?	Does	it	become	more	difficult	to	sustain	a	purely	playful	orientation,	in	isolation	from	considerations	of	quantifiable	success,	as	the	moral	career	of	a
streamer	progresses?
14.	Zolides,	2015,	p.	43.
15.	See	Johnson	and	Woodcock	(2017).	Studying	the	cross-pollination	of	celebrities	and	Internet	visibility	across	multiple	content	creation	platforms	is	a	rich
direction	for	future	enquiry,	and	will	shed	further	light	upon	many	of	the	theoretical	concerns	—	self-promotion,	digital	celebrity,	the	cultivation	of	the	image	of
the	self-motivated	individual,	and	so	forth	—	elucidated	in	this	paper.
16.	There	are	approximately	two	million	people	who	stream	regularly	and	well	over	20,000	‘partnered’	streamers,	which	is	to	say	streamers	who	communicate
directly	with	Twitch	and	gain	significant	benefits	when	attempting	to	make	an	income	on	the	platform.
17.	Goffman,	1963,	p.	68.
18.	Zolides,	2015,	p.	42.
19.	Zolides,	2015,	p.	43.
20.	Ibid.
21.	Standing,	2011,	loc	353.
22.	Dyer-Witheford,	2015,	p.	42.
23.	Standing,	2011,	loc	34.
24.	Holts,	2013,	p.	31.
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